PacketSafari
ReleaseOct 31, 2026

anoncap: Keyed Pseudonyms, Privacy Levels, Encrypted Payload Removed, and a Sweep That Finds Nothing

anoncap 4.7.3 (20261031.2) and Anonymizer 0.2.0: keyed pseudonyms, three privacy levels, encrypted payload removed by default, and a clean 504-capture sweep.
PCAP anonymization
anoncap
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Oliver RipkaOliver Ripka
anoncap: Keyed Pseudonyms, Privacy Levels, Encrypted Payload Removed, and a Sweep That Finds Nothing

A customer asked us a simple question this month: if two people run anoncap on the same capture, do they get the same pseudonyms? They did. Pseudonyms were derived from the original values with fixed rules, so anyone with the tool could, in principle, work backwards. That is fixed, and while we were at it we rebuilt the way anoncap decides what to keep readable and ran the engine against every capture we have until nothing original came out.

anoncap 4.7.3 (20261031.2) and PacketSafari Anonymizer 0.2.0 are available now for macOS, Windows, and Linux.

Keyed pseudonyms

Every pseudonym is now picked with a 256-bit key. The class of a value stays what it was: a private address stays private, a public address stays public, a vendor prefix of a MAC address stays, a phone number keeps its length. Only the choice inside that class depends on the key, through HMAC-SHA256.

  • The CLI creates the key on first use (--key-file, 64 hex characters) or takes it from the environment; reports carry the key fingerprint so you can tell which runs belong together.
  • The Anonymizer app keeps one key for you. Files you drop today and files you drop next week get the same pseudonyms, so a ticket that spans several captures stays consistent, and nobody without the key can map them back. Settings lets you start fresh pseudonyms or move the key to another machine.
  • A legacy mode reproduces the old unkeyed behaviour for comparisons with older anonymized files; nothing in the apps uses it.

Privacy levels

Anonymization is a trade-off between hiding and troubleshooting. Three levels make the trade-off explicit:

  • Strict replaces every name, number, and identifier, including public domain names and phone country codes.
  • Balanced, the default, keeps what a network engineer needs to read the capture and what a company is usually comfortable sharing: top-level domains and the last label of public names, role words such as mail or dc01 with their instance digits rewritten, well-known public services, country codes, and operator codes in subscriber identities. Identities are always replaced.
  • Readable additionally keeps the registrable domain of the thousand most popular sites, so browsing destinations stay recognizable while every host, user, and address is still rewritten.

The level is one switch in the apps and --privacy-level on the command line.

Encrypted payload leaves, cleartext stays

Until now the safe default removed every byte above the transport headers, which also removed the HTTP, DNS, SIP and Diameter content a troubleshooter needs. The new default keeps cleartext application data and anonymizes it, and removes only what nobody can read without a key: the bodies of TLS, DTLS, QUIC, SSH, ESP and WireGuard records. Their headers stay, so record sizes, handshakes and timing remain visible, and no decryption secret is ever written to the output. Files shrink accordingly. If a receiver is meant to decrypt with a key you hand over separately, choose "Application evidence", which keeps everything.

Checksums now keep their status through every rewrite: a good checksum stays good, a bad one stays bad by the same amount, a zero UDP checksum stays zero, and the two offload forms a capturing host leaves behind stay as they were, also inside tunnels and across fragmented datagrams.

The sweep

We added a check that does not trust the rewriter: anonymize a capture, decode it again with Wireshark field by field, and compare every decoded value with the original, per frame. Any value that comes out unchanged is a finding. The first run over our corpus (telco cores, enterprise samples, the public test corpora; 504 captures today) produced 555 such rows. Today's release produces none, and a second check that does not trust the dissectors either, a search for every original identity as raw bytes anywhere in the written file, finds nothing too. Along the way we found that the end-of-file pass was quadratic in the number of learned values; a 45,000-frame capture that took hours now takes about a minute per pass.

Most of what we found was not a missing rule but a wrong place: a value that Wireshark had reassembled from several TCP segments, SCTP chunks, or IP fragments, which the rewriter then looked for in the wrong frame. anoncap now writes such values through the dissector's own reassembly bookkeeping, byte-exact, in the frame that holds them. Along the way the engine learned to rewrite NTLM user and host names inside HTTP authentication tokens, NetBIOS and browser names, Kerberos service hosts, TLS server names in QUIC client hellos that Chrome splits over several packets and retransmits, Diameter over SCTP, MAP and ISUP numbers, SDP owner lines, and MAC addresses written as text, and to repair checksums inside tunnels. It also stopped two kinds of damage we only saw thanks to the sweep: a version string that had become an address mapping and junk host names picked up from binary payloads.

The sweep runs in our test suite, so new rules and new protocols are checked the same way.

Get it

  • the Anonymizer app 0.2.0 for macOS (Apple silicon, macOS 14 or later, notarized) and Windows (installer or portable zip, x64), on request from the anoncap page;
  • the anoncap CLI 4.7.3 (20261031.2) for Linux, macOS (Apple silicon), and Windows from downloads.packetsafari.com, with checksums, the source patch, and the Wireshark license.

If you run anoncap in a pipeline, add the key file to your secrets now: the next run without it creates a new key and new pseudonyms.