Shorten multi-vendor MTTR
Give operations, engineering, vendors, and customers one packet chronology instead of parallel interpretations of counters and logs.
Enterprise packet investigation · Telecommunications
Investigate service outages, performance degradation, protocol failures, and malicious traffic across mobile core, IMS, signaling, media, charging, and IP transport—with packet evidence every team can inspect.
Preserve the nested failure and transport context; do not collapse the capture into a generic “Diameter success” summary.
Operational value
Measure cases per month, responder hours, time to useful evidence, ruled-out domains, vendor handoffs, and avoidable service-impact minutes during evaluation.
Give operations, engineering, vendors, and customers one packet chronology instead of parallel interpretations of counters and logs.
Localize failed registration, session setup, charging, call setup, media quality, transport backpressure, and tunnel-path degradation.
Review C2 behavior, covert DNS, east-west movement, scan or flood aggregates, suspicious infrastructure, and configured threat-intelligence matches.
Turn specialist packet work into reviewable filters, frames, transactions, coverage, and next checks that wider operations teams can use.
Simple value estimate
Use three planning assumptions. Count only incidents where packet investigation is part of the response and only hours you genuinely believe better evidence could remove.
Illustrative planning estimate—not a PacketSafari guarantee or customer result. Validate time saved and business impact during an evaluation.
Critical systems and protocol depth
These are target investigation surfaces. Available depth depends on capture position, protocol fields, encryption, product profile, and the representative case validated during evaluation.
SIP · SDP · RTP/RTCP · DiameterWhich dialog branch failed? Did signaling complete? Is poor media caused by loss, jitter, sequence gaps, codec negotiation, or the capture itself?
NGAP/S1AP · PFCP · GTP-C/U · SCTPWhere did registration, bearer, session, mobility, or user-plane setup diverge—and which control-plane evidence supports it?
Diameter · RADIUS · DNS · TLSDoes command-level success hide a failed nested result? Is the symptom application logic, peer response, routing, or transport backpressure?
SIGTRAN · SCCP · TCAP · MAP · SCTPCan related transactions, endpoints, timing, and result codes be reconstructed without flattening the trace into generic warnings?
TCP · UDP · BGP · DNS · TLS · SSH · SNMPSeparate loss, reordering, MTU or MSS, receiver constraints, path policy, TLS resets, service wait, and infrastructure anomalies.
Network-wide behavioral and signature evidenceCorrelate Suricata-compatible detections, periodic C2, tunnels, lateral paths, aggregate scans or floods, and offline intelligence with packets.
Security and resilience context
Article 40 calls for proportionate measures to manage security risk and prevent or minimise incident impact on users and other networks.
EU Directive 2018/1972National implementation can impose risk-management, incident-handling, continuity, supply-chain, and reporting obligations on covered entities.
ENISA NIS2 overviewTelecom security depends on technical context, evidence exchange, response maturity, and service resilience—not alerts without packet-level interpretation.
GSMA T-ISACPacketSafari supports technical investigation and evidence review. It does not certify EECC, NIS2, or other regulatory compliance; applicability depends on jurisdiction, entity classification, and the organization’s controls.
Start with one representative failure